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Background: To accompany the lifting of COVID-19 lockdown measures, Luxembourg implemented a mass
screening (MS) programme. The first phase coincided with an early summer epidemic wave in 2020.
Methods: rRT-PCR-based screening for SARS-CoV-2 was performed by pooling of samples. The infrastructure
allowed the testing of the entire resident and cross-border worker populations. The strategy relied on social
connectivity within different activity sectors. Invitation frequencies were tactically increased in sectors and
regions with higher prevalence. The results were analysed alongside contact tracing data.
Findings: The voluntary programme covered 49% of the resident and 22% of the cross-border worker popula-
tions. It identified 850 index cases with an additional 249 cases from contact tracing. Over-representation
was observed in the services, hospitality and construction sectors alongside regional differences. Asymptom-
atic cases had a significant but lower secondary attack rate when compared to symptomatic individuals.
Based on simulations using an agent-based SEIR model, the total number of expected cases would have been
42¢9% (90% CI [-0¢3, 96¢7]) higher without MS. Mandatory participation would have resulted in a further dif-
ference of 39¢7% [19¢6, 59¢2].
Interpretation: Strategic and tactical MS allows the suppression of epidemic dynamics. Asymptomatic carriers
represent a significant risk for transmission. Containment of future outbreaks will depend on early testing in
sectors and regions. Higher participation rates must be assured through targeted incentivisation and recur-
rent invitation.
Funding: This project was funded by the Luxembourg Ministries of Higher Education and Research, and
Health.
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The COVID-19 pandemic has created an unprecedented public
health crisis with a deep impact on health, social life, and the econ-
omy. Governments are devising new strategies to limit the impact of
the evolving pandemic on their healthcare systems and societies. In
the absence of wide-spread immunity, containment strategies are
limited to testing and tracing [1-3].
Research in context
Evidence before this study
The COVID-19 pandemic imposes unprecedented challenges to
governments and public health officials in containing popula-
tion-wide transmission of SARS-CoV-2. Mass screening (MS)
has been suggested as a means to systematically identify posi-
tive carriers including asymptomatic individuals. It was for
example applied early on in the pandemic in South Korea and
recommended on a national level for the United Kingdom.
However, the design and implementation of MS programmes
imposes significant logistical, methodological and data analysis
challenges. Furthermore, recurrent questions over the effec-
tiveness of such programmes have been posed, especially over
the role of asymptomatic carriers in triggering and sustaining
infection chains. To accompany the progressive lifting of lock-
down measures, Luxembourg implemented a MS programme
covering its entire population.
Added value of this study
Our study presents the major results and lessons learned of the
implemented population-wide screening programme. Rather
than perform MS in a single instance, the test strategy was
based on social connectivity within activity sectors. This
allowed the programme to build up practicable test capacity
while ensuring coverage of specific at-risk sectors at high reso-
lution while the general population was screened at lower reso-
lution. The resolution of the screening was dynamically
adjusted based on prevalence in the respective sectors and the
population. Based on a participation of 49% amongst the resi-
dent population and 22% amongst cross-border workers, the
MS allowed identification of 1,099 cases corresponding to 26%
of positive cases related to an early summer epidemic wave.
We show that a population-wide screening programme is able
to affect the epidemic dynamics in close coordination with clas-
sical contact tracing.
Importantly, our study highlights that asymptomatic indi-
viduals represent a significant risk for transmission.
Implications of all the available evidence
Our study confirms that MS via a pooled rRT-PCR strategy and
contact tracing allows the population-wide control of viral
transmission. The finding that asymptomatic individuals are
similarly infectious as symptomatic patients implies that popu-
lation-wide containment strategies have to rely on MS to
ensure the early breaking of infection chains. Containment of
future outbreaks will critically depend on early testing in work
sectors and geographical regions. Our analyses, based on the
situation and capacities in Luxembourg, imply that a threshold
of 150 positive cases per 100,000 per week should trigger the
testing of entire groups. Higher participation rates have to be
assured through targeted incentivisation and recurrent
invitations.
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symptomatic carriers could transmit the virus [4,5]. Based on the esti-
mated serial interval and incubation period, modelling suggested that
up to 44% (25-69%) of transmission occurred just before symptoms
appear [6]. This, together with apparent overdispersion [7], drew
into question classical pandemic containment strategies. As the pop-
ulation-wide exposure in Luxembourg was estimated to be 2¢1% in
late April [8], large-scale antibody screening would not have beenefficient and would not have supported mitigation measures includ-
ing contact tracing. Furthermore, given the large susceptibility for
infection, the acquisition of herd immunity was not considered an
option.
The Luxembourg Government imposed stringent lockdown meas-
ures in mid-March. The gradual easing of restrictions was accompa-
nied by a population-wide SARS-CoV-2 screening programme aimed
at pre-emptive breaking of infection chains. Our approach hinged on
social connectivity as the key parameter for the stratification of the
population, independent of COVID-19 symptoms, or potential contact
with infected carriers. The number of expected social interactions
defined the testing frequency per activity sector. This design resulted
in ‘adaptable testing’ using differing testing frequencies, which were
dynamically adjusted based on prevalence in the respective sectors.
Here we provide a detailed description of the mass screening (MS)
programme, analyse the results of the first phase (25th May until 15th
September 2020) including contact tracing information and model
the impact of the programme on epidemic dynamics. We show that
the population-wide screening programme with a participation rate
of 49% among residents was able to contain the epidemic dynamics
in close coordination with classical contact tracing. According to our
data, asymptomatic SARS-CoV-2 carriers are to be considered as
infectious as symptomatic individuals. Therefore, the success of MS
critically depends on broad participation and incentivisation.
2. Methods
2.1. Logistics
To facilitate the sampling of the entire Luxembourg resident pop-
ulation along with cross-border workers, a pre-analytic workflow
with 17 drive- or walk-through sampling stations was established.
The analytical capacity reached up to 20,000 tests/day with a turn-
over of two working days.
2.2. Assay
Real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (rRT-
PCR) was performed using the Fast Track Diagnostics (FTD)TM SARS-
CoV-2 single well dual-target (ORF1ab, N gene) assay (Fast Track
Diagnostics, Esch-sur-Alzette, Luxembourg) for nucleic acids
extracted from oropharyngeal swabs.
To save time and costs, an implemented pooling strategy involved
mixing the samples from 4 different individuals prior to RNA extrac-
tion and re-analysing samples from a positive pool individually a sec-
ond time [9-15]. Pool size selection for a one-stage pooling strategy
was driven by identifying a suitable trade-off between estimated
prevalence in asymptomatic SARS-CoV-2 carriers, analytical sensitiv-
ity and specificity (both 100% according to the rRT-PCR kit’s manufac-
turer) as well as technical and practical constraints. Given the
prevalence of asymptomatic SARS-CoV-2 carriers at 0¢3% at the time
of implementation and allowing an increase of prevalence to 10% [8],
the optimal pool size was determined as four [16]. The pooling strat-
egy presented 100% sensitivity and 100% specificity when compared
with individual sample processing (deconvoluted RNA extraction and
rRT-PCR testing; Suppl. Note 1). Thus, any uncertainty that may arise
from false positives or false negatives was not accounted for in the
data analysis.
2.3. Data source and population
All confirmed positive cases of SARS-CoV-2 detected by rRT-PCR
were reported on a mandatory basis by the clinical laboratory and
were automatically included in the centralised contact tracing man-
agement system of the Health Directorate (Ministry of Health, Lux-
embourg). Once a new positive result was transmitted via secure
P. Wilmes et al. / The Lancet Regional Health - Europe 4 (2021) 100056 3electronic reporting to the Health Directorate, the index case was
contacted by phone typically on the same day. A health questionnaire
including typical COVID-19 symptoms (headaches, myalgia, fever,
runny nose, sore throat, cough, loss of smell, diarrhea, etc.) was com-
pleted. Positive cases were instructed to self-isolate immediately and
avoid contact with other household members. All high-risk contacts
which occurred within 48 hours before symptom onset (or before the
date of test if asymptomatic) were ordered to self-quarantine. A con-
tact was considered high-risk if there was physical contact or prox-
imity (< 2 meters) to a case for at least 15 minutes without wearing a
mask. For each quarantined contact, a laboratory test was automati-
cally prescribed on the 5th day after the date of last contact. If the test
was negative, the quarantine ended automatically on the 8th day and
was followed by 7 days of self-surveillance. If the test was positive,
the person was contacted again as a new positive case thereby start-
ing the contact tracing procedure anew. If the contact did not take a
test before the 7th day, the period of quarantine was automatically
extended by 7 days to a total of 14 days.
Asymptomatic individuals are those that did not report symptoms
at the time of the notification of the positive test result. Thereby, the
“asymptomatic” group included individuals who were either pre-
symptomatic or truly asymptomatic. Similarly, symptomatic individ-
uals may have been asymptomatic at the time of sampling,
particularly presymptomatic carriers who subsequently developed
symptoms.
The COVID-19 surveillance data was linked to the national data-
base managed by General Inspectorate of Social Security using the
national identification number. The personal data were available
only to the contact tracing team and were transmitted in aggregated,
pseudonymised form to the authors.
2.4. Statistical analyses
Two logistic regression models were built to identify the determi-
nants associated with participation in MS (Yes, No) and being tested
positive (Yes, No). Models were adjusted for the following variables:
gender (Male, Female), 10-year age categories, country of residence
(Luxembourg, Belgium, France, Germany, Other), disposable income
categories (<30k€/year, 30-60k€/year, 60-90k€/year, 90k€/year),
number of total invitations to participate in MS (for the model on par-
ticipation only), medication use in the past 6 months to treat a
chronic condition (Yes, No), and risk population (high-risk, medium
risk, general). We computed secondary attack rates (SAR) in three dif-
ferent ways: overall (SAR), in the household (SARH) and for close con-
tacts (SARCC), both for symptomatic and asymptomatic cases. The
SAR was defined as the number of contacts who became positive
divided by the number of total contacts. SARH was defined as the
number of contacts who became positive divided by the number of
contacts who live in the same place as the positive index case. SARCC
was defined as the number of close contacts who became positive
divided by the number of close contacts who were placed in quaran-
tine (the contact had a high-risk interaction with the COVID-19 posi-
tive case). For all SAR calculations, the new cases were considered
positive contacts if they became positive within five days after the
last date of contact with an index case.
To assess the impact of the MS programme on the epidemic
dynamics, we developed an agent-based SEIR model similar to Cova-
sim [17], tailored to the situation in Luxembourg. The epidemic
model was based on detailed information of the social network con-
sidering actual household and workplace compositions obtained
from the Luxembourg social security system. It also contained a dis-
ease module to integrate hospital data. This detailed description
allowed for respecting the age distribution of infected people and
considering specific activities as well as the resulting infection risks
at workplaces. The testing of symptomatic individuals based on pre-
scription, the testing by MS, and the testing of contacts of index caseswere separated in the model and fitted to the observations (Suppl.
Note 2).
2.5. Role of the funding source
1) Phase 1 of Large-Scale Testing was mandated by the Luxembourg
Government, represented by the Ministry of Higher Education
and Research, and the Ministry of Health.
2) Representatives of the Ministry of Higher Education and
Research, and the Ministry of Health were involved in the design
of this study as well as in the collection, analysis, and interpreta-
tion of data and in the writing of the article. Both Ministries
approved submission of the manuscript for publication.
3. Results
3.1. Epidemic context
The first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic touched Luxembourg
over the months of March and April 2020, followed by a relatively
low number of positive cases from end of April onwards, when lock-
down measures were gradually lifted (Fig. 1). A second wave started
in late June. Although a plateau in the number of positive cases was
reached in August, there was another increase in the middle of Sep-
tember when the school vacation period ended (Fig. 1). The first
phase of the MS programme ran from 25th May until 15th September
2020 (herein contact tracing data was considered until 24th Septem-
ber). This period coincided with the second epidemic wave.
4. Approach to mass testing
4.1. Design of programme
The testing strategy was designed in an intercalated, three-lay-
ered approach: on a first level, we used estimates of exposure to dis-
ease and physical proximity to categorize activity sectors into high
and medium risk [18,19]. Workers in high-risk sectors were invited
every two weeks, resulting in high-frequency testing (Fig. 2A). On a
second level, workers and other members of the population in
medium-risk sectors were monitored at medium testing frequency
by inviting one out of five per week such that individuals in medium-
risk sectors were at least invited once (Fig. 2B). Similarly, one in every
ten Luxembourg residents in other sectors or the general population
was invited at low testing frequency each week to cover an even geo-
graphical distribution (Fig. 2C). Consequently, a set of representative
cross-sectional cohorts were established. These population- and sec-
tor-based tracking cohorts proved essential for the early detection of
sector- or region-specific infection clusters. On a third level, we
reserved sufficient capacity for tactical targeting of specific popula-
tion groups that revealed increased prevalences in the level two
monitoring approach. If the prevalence in the sector-specific tracking
cohorts exceeded 10%, the entire sector was tested; equally, adult
members of every household in geographical areas with increased
infection rates were invited. In this way, the testing frequencies were
dynamically adjusted to maximize the use of available resources
without compromising the efficiency of outbreak prevention
(Fig. 2C). The established capacity allowed for a maximum test capac-
ity of 10% of residents and cross-border workers per week.
4.2. Invitations and participation
The initial sets of invitations were sent out between 25th May and
27th July. The strategy critically depended on participation upon invi-
tation, as the system was entirely based on a voluntary basis.
Fig. 1. Epidemic curve for COVID-19 in Luxembourg.
4 P. Wilmes et al. / The Lancet Regional Health - Europe 4 (2021) 100056Invitations to residents and cross-border workers were sent out by
postal mail (Suppl. Figure 1). Addressees were able to make an
appointment via an online portal or by telephone, at one of the 17
test stations strategically distributed around the country. Compliance
was very high, as 95% of the individuals who made an appointment
were tested. Among the residents, 307,751, i.e. 49% of the population,
took part in the MS, whereas among the cross-border workers, par-
ticipation was 22¢5% (87,198 individuals). A total of 566,320 tests was
performed based on a total of 1,436,000 invitations, which corre-
sponds to 69¢7% of all tests performed between 25th May and 15th
September and to an overall response rate of 39¢4%. Participation in
the programme differed markedly based on socio-demographic fac-
tors (Suppl. Note 3).Fig. 2. Strategic and tactical mass testing.
The frequencies of invitations resulted in (A) high-frequency testing for high-risk sector
population was monitored at low testing frequency and targeted invitations were sent in the4.3. Contact tracing
The MS uncovered 850 index cases with an additional 249 cases
resulting from contact tracing (Table 1). This corresponds to 26% of
positive cases related to the epidemic wave. Among the index cases,
567 (67%) reported symptoms at the time of being informed of their
positive test result (these may have been presymptomatic at the time
of the test), whereas 283 (33%) were asymptomatic. Symptomatic
cases were slightly older (mean=36¢8 years) than asymptomatic indi-
viduals (34¢2 years, Wilcoxon test p<0¢0001). Around 53% of all cases
were diagnosed in men. rRT-PCR Cq-values were higher in asymp-
tomatic cases (mean Cq=30¢2) compared to symptomatic cases
(mean Cq=28¢9, Wilcoxon test p<0¢0001).s and (B) medium-frequency testing for medium-risk sectors. (C) The prevalence in the
case of regional flare-ups.
Table 1
Characteristics of index cases identified through mass screening.
Characteristics With symptoms (N=567) Without symptoms (N=283) Total (N=850) P value
N % N % N %
Sex Female 278 49 125 44¢2 403 47¢4 0¢18*
Male 289 51 158 55¢8 447 52¢6
Age (in years) 0-9 12 2¢1 26 9¢2 38 4¢5 <0¢0001*
10-19 65 11¢5 49 17¢3 114 13¢4
20-29 131 23¢1 55 19¢4 186 21¢9
30-39 120 21¢2 43 15¢2 163 19¢2
40-49 118 20¢8 35 12¢4 153 18
50-59 80 14¢1 52 18¢4 132 15¢5
60 41 7¢2 23 8¢1 64 7¢6
Country of residence Belgium 16 2¢8 10 3¢5 26 3¢1 0¢39*
Germany 4 0¢7 3 1¢1 7 0¢8
France 52 9¢2 17 6 69 8¢1
Luxembourg 495 87¢3 253 89¢4 748 88
Period (in weeks) 25  28 101 17¢8 49 17¢3 150 17¢6 <0¢0001*
29 105 18¢5 36 12¢7 141 16¢6
30 93 16¢4 36 12¢7 129 15¢2
31 77 13¢6 43 15¢2 120 14¢1
32 - 33 31 5¢5 31 11 62 7¢3
34 24 4¢2 8 2¢8 32 3¢8
35 22 3¢9 13 4¢6 35 4¢1
36 43 7¢6 9 3¢2 52 6¢1
37 54 9¢5 21 7¢4 75 8¢8
38 17 3 37 13¢1 54 6¢4
Mean STD Mean STD Mean STD
Age (in years) 36¢8 15¢3 34¢2 18¢9 35¢9 16¢6 <0¢0001#
rRT-PCR Cq values 28¢9 5¢3 30¢2 5¢1 29¢3 5¢3 <0¢0001#
* Chi-square test
# Wilcoxon test
P. Wilmes et al. / The Lancet Regional Health - Europe 4 (2021) 100056 5The 850 index cases resulted in 7,909 contacts. After the removal
of redundancy, 6,074 were further considered (Fig. 3). Each index
case resulted in an average of 8¢3 contacts (range 1-101) and in a
mean of 0¢7 (SD=1¢1) subsequent positive contacts. The positive
index cases with no symptoms infected slightly fewer contacts than
the symptomatic individuals (Wilcoxon test, p<0¢0001) whereby 0¢6
(SD=1) and 0¢7 (SD=1¢1) positive contacts resulted per index case
with contacts from asymptomatic and symptomatic cases, respec-
tively. Thereby, cases which were asymptomatic on the day of the
positive result overall had a significant but lower secondary attack
rate compared to those who were symptomatic (SAR=0¢02 (SD=0¢09)
versus SAR=0¢04 (SD=0¢12), p<0¢0001). This was reflected inFig. 3. Flowchart detailing numbers of contacts rhouseholds (SARH=0¢05 (SD=0¢18) versus SARH=0¢10 (SD=0¢24),
p<0¢0001) as well as for close contacts (SARCC=0¢02 (SD=0¢11) versus
SARCC=0¢05 (SD=0¢16), p<0¢0001). Infections were mostly linked to
travel to a foreign country (31¢4%), the household setting (23¢2%), or
the work environment (20%).
Overall, there were more contacts in the “asymptomatic” than in
the “symptomatic” group (8¢5 vs 8¢2, Wilcoxon test p<0¢0001). The
difference between the date of the positive result for the index case
and the date of last contact was higher in the “asymptomatic” group
(4¢36 days) compared to the other (1¢86 days; Wilcoxon test,
p<0¢0001). A total of 84¢6% of the contacts declared by the asymp-
tomatic individuals were high-risk contacts (placed into quarantine).esulting from the 850 identified index cases.
Fig. 4. Testing in the construction sector since its reopening.
Fig. 5. Cumulative numbers of cases per 100000 population, by canton.
6 P. Wilmes et al. / The Lancet Regional Health - Europe 4 (2021) 100056In contrast, 73¢8% of the contacts declared by the symptomatic indi-
viduals were high-risk contacts (also placed into quarantine; Chi-
square test, p<0¢0001).
With regards to factors associated with being tested positive
(Suppl. Table 1), we observed no difference in relation to sex (OR
0¢92 [0¢76-1¢09] for women compared to men). People who worked
in the medium- and high-risk sectors had greater odds for being
tested positive (OR 1¢41 [1¢12-1¢78] and 2¢24 [1¢77-2¢85], respec-
tively). Individuals with a disposable household income of less than
30k€/year had the highest odds of being tested positive (OR 1¢87
[1¢53-2¢28] when compared to people with 30k€-60k€/year). When
compared to people between 30-39 years old, age groups of 20-29
(OR 1¢93 [1¢39-2¢68]), 40-49 (OR 1¢77 [1¢27-2¢46]) and 50-59 (OR
1¢46 [1¢03-2¢08]) had greater odds of being tested positive, whereas
no difference was observed for people aged 60-69 (OR 0¢86 [0¢54-
1¢38]) or 70-79 (OR 0¢53 [0¢27-1¢04]), and lower odds were observed
for extreme age groups, such as individuals 9 years old (OR 0¢35
[0¢20-0¢61]) or 80 years old (OR 0¢37 [0¢15-0¢91]).
4.4. Prevalence in specific sectors and regions
Over the course of the testing of the high- and medium-risk sec-
tors, the prevalence was not evenly distributed according to the
assumed risk and period covered (Suppl. Note 4, Suppl. Table 2,
Suppl. Figure 3, Suppl. Figure 4). For instance, enrichment in positive
cases was observed in the services sector (classified among the gen-
eral population; 11¢4% increase over the mean prevalence), hospital-
ity (high-risk; 8¢6%) and the construction sector (medium-risk; 6¢6%).
Moreover, we observed regional differences (33¢7% for the canton of
Esch-sur-Alzette versus 21¢1% for Luxembourg). In addition, the prev-
alence for individuals from different income categories was not
evenly distributed (Suppl. Note 5, Suppl. Figure 5).
4.5. Tactical interventions
Sector- and region-specific prevalences were monitored in accor-
dance with the programme design. At the end of April-beginning of
May, specific working sectors received invitations as part of the grad-
ual reopening. As it was the first to be reopened, the entire construc-
tion sector was invited on 25th May. However, the higher number oftests did not result in higher number of positive cases in that sector
(Fig. 4). During the subsequent epidemic wave, the prevalence in the
construction sector was significantly higher than in the other sectors
(as an increase of 6¢6%, or 1,390 cases per 100,000 inhabitants over
the entire period versus 5¢7%, or 698 per 100,000 on average, in other
sectors; this corresponds to an incidence rate ratio (IRR) of 1¢99, (95%
CI [1¢94,2], p < 0¢00001)). The peak in prevalence was reached on
24th July with 87¢7 infected individuals in the construction sector per
100,000 inhabitants. Consequently, this sector was again invited for
testing. The number of tests increased and showed two more peaks
during the weeks starting 27th July and 24th August, the latter corre-
sponding to the end of the collective holidays in this sector. However,
by late August, the second epidemic wave had peaked, which is
reflected in the declining numbers of positive cases identified in the
construction sector (Fig. 4, Suppl. Figure 6). The services and
Fig. 6. Impact analysis by agent-based modelling
(A) Daily detected cases from the simulated actual scenario together with 7-day moving average of true data. (B, C) The second wave in terms of active cases (B) and total cases
(C) in the actual scenario, a scenario without mass screening, and a scenario with full participation. (D) The effect of trigger date and the numbers of tests in regional targeting in
relation to the reduction in total cases.
P. Wilmes et al. / The Lancet Regional Health - Europe 4 (2021) 100056 7hospitality sectors also received additional, targeted invitations based
on increases in prevalence (Suppl. Note 6).
Based on the population-based monitoring, increases in preva-
lence were observed in the south-west communes belonging to
the canton of Esch-sur-Alzette starting in mid-July (Fig. 5).
Between the 1st July and the 20th July, the prevalence in the can-
ton was 327¢1 cases per 100,000 inhabitants compared to a mean
prevalence of 108¢6 cases per 100,000 in all other cantons (IRR
3¢01, 95% CI [2¢98,3¢05], p<0¢00001). Based on the observation
that the majority of transmissions was occurring in households,
each household in the high-prevalence communes of the Esch-
sur-Alzette canton received an invitation over one week starting
on 27th July (36,197 unique invitations with the exception of
households already invited as part of targeted sectors such as
services and hospitality).Table 2
Impact of mass screening on numbers of cases.
Scenario Total cases* 25/5-15/09/2020 P
Actual development 12395 [7350, 20340] 2
No MS 17248 [10257, 27271]
(+42¢9%y [-0¢3, +96¢7])
3
Full participation 7258 [4439, 10747]
(-39¢7% [-59¢2, -19¢6])
1
No sector targeting 13053 [7683, 20264]
(+7¢9% [-26¢4, +63¢8])
2
No regional targeting 12589 [7683, 20264]
(+1¢8% [-7¢8, +12¢2])
2
No contact tracing for MS cases 15530 [9192, 26933]
(+27¢3% [-2¢0, +77¢2])
3
* Total number of cases includes both detected and undetected cases
y Percentages in the table show the difference to the actual developm
vidual replicates (Suppl. Note 2). MS: mass screening.4.6. Impact analysis
To assess the impact of MS on the epidemic dynamics, we used an
agent-based SEIR model tailored to the situation in Luxembourg in
terms of implemented measures and detected cases identified by
classical prescription, MS and contact tracing (Fig. 6A). Based on the
calibrated model, the effect of the MS was quantified [20] by compar-
ing the projected number of active cases for the actual development
scenario with 566,320 MS tests performed during the period from 1st
June until 15th September to a scenario without any MS and to a set-
ting in which all the 1,436,000 invitations would have been complied
with (Fig. 6B). The analysis of the amplitude of active cases highlights
that, without the implemented MS, the peak of active cases would
have increased by 29¢0% and that full participation would have led to
a further reduction of 29¢4% (Table 2). This positive effect of MS iseak height (active cases) Intensive care unit peak occupancy






















ent scenario. These are calculated based on the statistics of indi-
8 P. Wilmes et al. / The Lancet Regional Health - Europe 4 (2021) 100056also highlighted by the number of total cases (Fig. 6C) which would
have been 42¢9% higher without the implemented test strategy and
full participation would have led to a further reduction of 39¢7%
(Table 2).
We observed that not performing the sector-specific screeningmod-
erately increased the amplitude of active cases by 7¢2% and the number
of total cases by 7¢9%. The regional targeting of the high-prevalence
communes in the canton of Esch-sur-Alzette during the weeks of 27th
July to 7th August increased the number of identified cases by MS by
13¢9% [3¢4,23¢2] in the canton (corresponding to 7¢1% [-3¢6,17¢1] on the
country level). Without these additional tests, there would have been
only a modest increase in total cases (+1¢8%) within the whole country
and a 7¢9% [-18¢5,42¢5] increase in the targeted canton during the period
from 27th July to 15th September. Simulations of different starting dates
and test numbers for the regional targeting (Fig. 6D) reveal that the
effect could have been nearly three times greater, had the regional tar-
geting started four weeks earlier.
The synergistic effect of MS and contact tracing was studied by
switching off tracing for index cases identified by MS. According to
our simulations (Table 2), the impact of mass screening may be
reduced by more than half without contact tracing (27¢3% [-2¢0,77¢2]
increase in total cases when no contact tracing would have been per-
formed for MS index cases).
5. Discussion
Mass screening for SARS-CoV-2 has been a topic of intense politi-
cal and societal debate, the rationale for screening asymptomatic
individuals having in particular been questioned. In May 2020, the
possibility of transmission from asymptomatic carriers was recog-
nised as a possible driver of the pandemic [4,5]. Appropriate meas-
ures, such as MS of presymptomatic and asymptomatic individuals,
at least in high-risk communities, were recommended [4,5]. Never-
theless, whether asymptomatic carriers play an important role in
population-based transmission has remained an essential question.
The MS programme implemented in Luxembourg, which coincided
with a second epidemic wave, thereby provides a unique test case for
assessing the role of asymptomatic carriers and the effectiveness of
testing and tracing to break infection chains early on.
Our data show that asymptomatic carriers infect on average the
same number of people as symptomatic individuals. The assessment
is robust, as the information of a positive carrier being symptom-free
was recorded by the contact tracing team once a person was
informed about their positive test result. Based on the incubation
time of a mean of 4-5 days and given that the test results were com-
municated to participants within two working days of sample collec-
tion, it is highly likely that a significant fraction of individuals did not
exhibit any symptoms at the time of testing [4,21]. With the number
of asymptomatic carriers estimated to be about four-fold the number
of positively tested symptomatic individuals at the end of the first
epidemic wave in Luxembourg [8], our data therefore implies that
asymptomatic including presymptomatic individuals are an impor-
tant factor in triggering and sustaining infection chains. Our work
indicates that, in Luxembourg and during the period of study, asymp-
tomatic individuals had significant SARs, both in households and
amongst close contacts, but these were lower compared to those for
symptomatic cases. Further dedicated studies need to focus on possi-
ble differences in infectivity and linked SAR between these two
groups as well as in other transmission contexts. Nevertheless, our
results highlight that classical pandemic containment strategies, such
as a consequential identification and isolation of symptomatic
patients, cannot work efficiently for COVID-19.
We acknowledge that a potential differential recall bias may exist
between asymptomatic and symptomatic cases due to the self-
reporting of symptoms as well as the fact that the data are generated
for public health surveillance purposes (isolation of cases andquarantining of their contacts) and not for research purposes. This poten-
tial bias may have partially affected our results. In addition, no data was
collected on low-risk contacts (which were not placed into quarantine)
and this could have had an effect on overestimating the SAR. Caution
needs to therefore be taken to compare these estimates with other stud-
ies which might have used different definitions for at-risk individuals.
Nevertheless, further analysis on the comparison and timing of symp-
toms onset alongside the SARwill soon be possible in Luxembourg.
Based on the sector-specific prevalences, the classification into
high- and medium-risk sectors proved appropriate for certain sectors
(2,384 and 1,022 invitations per positive case for healthcare and
social work, and hospitality, respectively) but not for others (2,810
and 9,095 invitations for pharmacists and police, for 0 and 1 positive
case, respectively). Medium-risk and sectors belonging to the general
population which should be reclassified as high-risk include the con-
struction and services sectors. Although recurrent invitations
increased participation, the overall compliance within the high-risk
sectors varied from 60¢8% of invitations being complied with amongst
preschool and primary teachers to 27¢5% in the hospitality sector.
Given the differing prevalence and participation rates in the different
sectors, it is challenging to assess the relationship between test fre-
quency and prevalence with the present dataset. Future dedicated
work is needed to assess sector-specific testing frequencies with
respect to their impact on prevalence and possible sector-specific
mitigation. Nevertheless, in addition to the ability to deploy test
capacity to affected work sectors and regions, broader participation
and compliance are essential to enhance the effectiveness of MS. This
may be achieved through tailored incentivisation.
Based on our simulations, without the MS programme, the num-
ber of cases would have increased substantially (42¢9%, (90% CI [-0¢3,
96¢7])) during the second epidemic wave. Further increase in testing
would have been even more impactful, whereby complete participa-
tion would have led to a 39¢7% [19¢6, 59¢2] decrease. The impact anal-
ysis is based on simulations and is therefore subject to uncertainties
as detailed in Suppl. Note 2. A retrospective analysis of sector- and
region-specific prevalences highlights that a threshold of 150 positive
cases per 100,000 per week should trigger the testing of entire
groups (Suppl. Figure 7). A caveat concerns smaller groups whereby
these are more prone to noise and, thus, false alarms may be raised.
Tactical testing may also be triggered by other early warning signals
based on population-level symptomatology or surveillance of waste-
water [22-24]. Rapid tactical interventions based on regional preva-
lence are essential for increasing efficiency.
Further viral pandemics are to be expected, even within this
decade [25,26]. As the role of asymptomatic carriers in the transmis-
sion of SARS-CoV-2 is becoming more and more recognised [27,28]
population-level containment and mitigation strategies need to take
this into account. Luxembourg was successful in quickly setting up
and implementing such a MS programme, with reliable, high-quality
assay material. According to our model, the intensive care unit peak
occupancy would have been 50¢5% [-20¢0, 135¢9] higher without MS,
whereas full participation would have resulted in a further reduction
of 55¢4% [15¢4, 80¢5]. Initial assessments of the economic impact of
the lockdown reveal that the loss in gross domestic product per cap-
ita and per month of lockdown is approximately €3,200 per Luxem-
bourg resident [29]. The opportunity cost of lockdown is significant
compared to the €30 per test. Thereby, the testing of the approxi-
mately 635,306 Luxembourg residents and 341,302 cross-border
workers represents a public health measure with important socio-
economic benefits. A detailed cost-benefit analysis, including com-
parisons to neighbouring regions and counties, contrasting different
non-pharmaceutical interventions including social distancing, mask
wearing, and MS would provide decision makers with an objective
basis for implementing future measures aimed at the continued miti-
gation of the spread of SARS-CoV-2. In any case, as evidenced by the
early summer epidemic wave, nascent infection chains were rapidly
P. Wilmes et al. / The Lancet Regional Health - Europe 4 (2021) 100056 9detected through MS, and effective contact tracing was ensured
through the closely controlled testing frequency.
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